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Abstract
Mobile devices are becoming the most popular way of connection, but pro-
tocols supporting mobility represent a serious source of concerns because
their initial design did not enforce strong security. This paper introduces a
novel class of stealth network attacks, called mobility-based evasion, where
an attacker splits a malicious payload in such a way that no part can be
recognized by existing defensive mechanisms including the most modern net-
work intrusion detection systems operating in stateful mode. We propose
an original cooperative framework for intrusion detection that can prevent
mobility-based evasion. The viability and performance of the proposed solu-
tion is shown through a prototype applied to Mobile IPv4, Mobile IPv6 and
WiFi protocols.
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1. Introduction
Society has become dependent on a wide array of mobile devices. For
example, most credit-card swipes at restaurants are performed with mobile
devices. RFID is widespread in inventory management. To lower infrastruc-
tural costs and to appease their employees, companies are seeking to enroll
so-called “Bring Your Own Device” (BYOD) policies that allow workers to
gain controlled access to the internal network resources through their mo-
bile devices (mainly laptops and phones). These devices tipically run a mix
of enterprise and personal applications. Cisco predicts that the number of
mobile devices will exceed the world population by 2014.
An inevitable consequence of the huge success of user mobility is an in-
creasing exposure of mobile devices and networks to a wide array of attacks.
In addition to eavesdropping on wireless transmissions [5, 15, 23], break-in
[33, 35], GSM impersonation [16, 13], social engineering [4], we present a novel
form of attacks called mobile evasion that can be applied to mobile proto-
cols, such as Mobile IPv4, Mobile IPv6 and WiFi. Mobile evasion leverages
the intrinsic vulnerability of mobile protocols supporting transparent mo-
bility where roaming events do not interrupt established connections [14].
This is a mandatory feature for all applications requiring a stable connec-
tion, but it exposes mobile nodes and related networks to so called “stealth”
network attacks. They do not exploit vulnerabilities in protocol implemen-
tations, but the effects of mobile node migrations on routing. An attacker
can route different portions of a malicious payload through different network
paths, thus avoiding the possibility of detection by typical defensive network
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mechanisms including anomaly-based [26, 12, 25], signature-based [1, 2, 11],
location-based [34] intrusion detection systems (NIDS) [30]. Existing de-
fensive mechanisms are not designed for facing transparent mobility, hence
they are inherently incapable of detecting a mobile stealth attack that is
fragmented, because no portion of the payload can be matched against the
NIDS signature database. Even the most advanced cooperative NIDSs (e.g.,
centralized [31, 32], hierarchical [24, 17], peer-to-peer [21, 19, 37, 20]) are
vulnerable because they cooperate by exchanging data pre-processed by one
NIDS.
We initially present a model of the mobile evasion attack that can be
applied to any well known mobile protocol. Then, we propose an innovative
solution that leverages a novel way for NIDS cooperation. The proposed
scheme allows sharing of internal state information among multiple NIDSs
deployed in different networks or network segments. The overall solution is
integrated into a prototype which extends Snort, but it can be easily adapted
to any other NIDS because the implementation is based on a lightweight
agent and a set of plugins handling different protocols. This modular design
guarantees great flexibility in terms of deployment and expandability. We
validate the efficacy and efficiency of the proposed framework for different
combinations of migration rates and network protocols. We can conclude
that the proposed solution can detect mobility-based attacks in all tested
real scenarios at a negligible cost in terms of performance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 compares our solution against
related work. Section 3 introduces a general model of the mobile evasion at-
tack and instantiates it for three mobile network protocols: Mobile IPv4,
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Mobile IPv6 and 802.11g. Section 4 proposes a novel cooperation scheme
that is able to thwart mobile evasion for a wide variety of roaming imple-
mentations. Sections 5, 6 and 7 present the relevant details for 802.11g,
Mobile IPv4 and Mobile IPv6. Section 8 discusses functional and perfor-
mance evaluation results obtained through experiments. Section 9 outlines
main conclusions.
2. Related work
Mobile ad-hoc networks represent an important source of information
about intrusion detection systems for wireless environments. For example,
Thamilarasu et al. [28] propose a Cross-layer Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) in order to mitigate DoS attacks in ad-hoc networks with a focus on
collisions, misdirection and packet drops. The cross-layer design is able to de-
tect intrusion at different protocol layers and to exploit the information from
one layer to another layer. Zhang et al. [36] propose a distributed and coop-
erative IDS architecture where each node participates with its information
resources. Other authors [22] address the issues related to a rigid response
to an intrusion by proposing a flexible scheme that depends on the measured
severity of attack and the degradation in network performance. We remark
that all these interesting proposals focus on ad-hoc networks that are quite
different from mobile Internet-based networks of interest for this paper. For
a similar reason, we distinguish from approaches using host IDS [11], and
from statistical profiling algorithms (e.g., [34]) that are ineffective against
mobile evasion.
We differ also from proposals using distributed intrusion detection sys-
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tems (e.g., [31, 32, 6]) that gather data from different sources and send alerts
to one aggregator analyzing and correlating all available information. These
solutions are based on different IDS architectures: hierarchical (e.g., Emer-
ald [24]), hierarchical and autonomous for cloud systems [17], peer-to-peer
(e.g., [21, 19, 37, 20] where the main goal is to avoid single points of failure).
All these systems are oriented to exchange high level information, filter and
aggregate it with the goal of reducing the amount of transferred data and
to increase the intrinsic value of alerts to human operators. On the other
hand, in order to contrast mobile evasion attacks, we have to share in an
efficient way raw data at the level of the NIDS internal states with mini-
mal pre-processing work. With respect to this objective, our work is more
related to NIDS architectures exploiting state migration. For example, par-
allel NIDS architectures [8, 27, 7, 3, 6] achieve cooperation by migrating the
connection state from one NIDS to another. In [27] the authors synchronize
one or more NIDS internal variables that are identified in the configuration
with the goal of generating a pool of values shared among all the cooperative
NIDS sensors distributed among different network links. The same mecha-
nisms for coordinating lower-level analysis were used to implement a NIDS
cluster [29], while a different framework provides methods to export/import
complete state information from/into a NIDS [8, 7, 3]. All these solutions use
state migration to pursue load balancing or to improve performance, while
our proposal describes a novel scheme to prevent an attacker to exploit mo-
bility to evade detection. This is achieved by supporting a mechanism where
the state information related to a Mobile Node “follows” the Mobile Node
in the new network. We improve on our previous paper [9] in several ways:
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we design a modular and general framework that supports different mobile
protocols, we implement it by extending the Snort software and we present a
large set of experimental results demonstrating functional and performance
effectiveness.
3. Mobility-based NIDS evasion
We describe the mobile evasion attack by considering the most advanced
stateful NIDS architectures, because stateless systems can be easily bypassed
by several types of attacks and are now deprecated. In a stateful NIDS, the
information of a network packet, which is relevant to intrusion, is used to
create and update an internal state about all the active transport level con-
nections. For each connection, a pre-processor maintains several metadata
and two ordered lists of payloads (one for each direction) exchanged by the
endpoints. The detection algorithm is then executed on the entire state in-
formation. As a consequence, although no individual packet contains enough
information to detect an intrusion, a stateful NIDS can detect it by corre-
lating information extracted from different packets. The problems originate
when we consider a scenario allowing node mobility where an attacker can
pursue mobility-based NIDS evasion that was introduced in [10]. Here, an
attacker exploits network mobility and evasion techniques based on attack
fragmentation in order to avoid detection even by the most advances state-
ful NIDS systems. This attack can be carried out in three scenarios that we
describe in the following subsections. We underline that the following scenar-
ios are independent of the mobile node roaming technology. Mobility-based
NIDS evasion can be carried out if these realistic conditions are met:
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1. the attack is a malicious payload exploiting a remote vulnerability;
2. it is possible to divide the malicious payload in at least two portions
Portion 1, Portion 2 such that nor Portion 1 neither Portion 2 are
detected by NIDS signatures;
3. the roaming process is transparent; active transport level connections
are not interrupted by the handover process.
The last assumption is satisfied by several technologies and network proto-
cols, such as Mobile IPv4, Mobile IPv6 and layer-2 protocols for handover
across wireless access points and networks.
3.1. Mobile attacker, fixed victim
Figure 1a introduces the first scenario in which two nodes, Attacker and
Victim, can communicate through the Internet. The attacker uses a mobile
node which initially operates in a Home Network that allows node mobil-
ity. To pursue the threat, the attacker will migrate to a Foreign Network
at some favorable time. Both the home and the foreign networks are mon-
itored by stateful, signature-based NIDSs. Initially, the attacker chooses a
remote vulnerability of the victim node and splits the corresponding payload
in Portion 1 and Portion 2. Since IP packet fragmentation is discouraged in
IPv6 and easily detected by modern NIDSs as anomalous network activity,
the attacker packs the two portions inside two not fragmented TCP segments
with consecutive sequence numbers. Then, the attacker establishes a TCP
connection with the victim and sends Portion 1 from his home network. The
home NIDS intercepts and analyzes Portion 1, updates its state information,
but it does not have enough information to detect an intrusion. Meanwhile,
the attacker roams to the foreign network.
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After the migration, packets between the attacker and the victim can be
routed through two different schemes: Direct Communication or Tunneling.
Figure 1a refers to direct communication, where the Portion 2 of the payload
is routed directly through the foreign network. Portion 2 is intercepted by
the foreign NIDS that has not received the previous packet and does not
have the necessary state information to recognize the attack. This state
information is possessed by the home NIDS, but it is useless since it does not
receive Portion 2. As a result, none of the two NIDSs deployed in the home
and in the foreign network can detect the attack. We note that this failure
is not the result of a bug in NIDS implementations. Node mobility allows
the malicious mobile attacker to perform a stealth attack, that is not due
to some bug(s) in NIDS implementations. Depending on how node mobility
is implemented, only a stateful NIDS installed in the victim node’s network
may be able to detect the intrusion attempt. In any case, both the home and
the foreign network infrastructures can be exploited by a mobile attacker to
damage third parties, without any evidence for the security administrator.
Figure 1b refers to the tunneling scheme. The packets sent by the attacker
are routed through the home network where a Home Agent processes them.
This scheme guarantees the mobile attacker to migrate from one network
to another while the fixed victim continues to reply to an address within
the home network. Depending on the mobility implementation, the attacker
might convey its packets through a Foreign Agent that is connected with the
home agent. In both cases, Portions 1 and 2 of the payload are intercepted by
the home network NIDS that can successfully detect the intrusion attempt.
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(a) Direct communication (b) Tunneling
3.2. Fixed attacker, mobile victim
In this scenario, the roles are reversed with respect to those in Section
3.1. Here, the mobile node is the victim while the attacker node is fixed. We
assume that the home and foreign networks are monitored by two stateful
NIDSs, and that the attacker knows when the mobile victim roams across
different networks. We show the feasibility for different mobile protocols in
Sections 5, 6 and 7. Figure 2a illustrates the attack in the direct communi-
cation scheme. The attacker establishes a TCP connection with the victim
and sends Portion 1 through its network to the home network. Portion 1
is intercepted and analyzed by the home NIDS, but it does not trigger an
alert since it is not recognized as malicious. Then, the attacker waits for the
mobile victim to roam to the foreign network. After the migration of the
mobile victim, the attacker sends Portion 2 to the foreign network. Here,
it is intercepted and analyzed by the foreign network NIDS, but it does not
trigger an alert since it is not recognized as malicious. Ultimately, neither
the home NIDS nor the foreign network NIDS receive enough information to
be able to detect the stealth attack.
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Figure 2b shows the attack in the tunneling scheme. Portion 1 is sent
directly to the mobile victim, hence it is received and analyzed by the home
NIDS. Portion 2 is sent by the attacker after the mobile victim roams to
the foreign network, and is routed through a home agent. Depending on
the mobility implementation, the home agent can forward packets directly
to the mobile victim or through a foreign agent in charge of the foreign
network. In this setup we have a partially stealth attack. The home NIDS
is able to inspect both portions of the payload, and to detect the attack.
However, it cannot sanitize the mobile victim nor protect the nodes within
the foreign network from the compromised machine. On the other hand,
the foreign NIDS can only analyze Portion 2, thus being unable to detect
the intrusion attempt. As a result, the mobile victim has been compromised
while connected to the foreign network, the network administrator having no
chance to detect the attack.
(a) Direct communication (b) Tunneling
3.3. Mobile attacker, mobile victim
The last scenario is a combination of the previous two cases. Here, both
the attacker and the victim are mobile nodes. We assume that all the four
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networks involved in this scenario (victim home network, victim foreign net-
work, attacker home network, attacker foreign network) are monitored by
stateful NIDSs, and that the attacker knows when the victim roams to the
foreign network. The attacker establishes a TCP connection with the victim
and sends Portion 1 through its home network to the victim home network.
Then, the attacker waits for the victim to roam to the foreign network. Then,
the attacker roams to a (possibly different) foreign network and sends Por-
tion 2. It is worth noting that the migration steps can be inverted without
changing the attack outcome. Since the attacker roams to a foreign network
before sending Portion 2, none of the two NIDSs deployed in the attacker’s
home and foreign networks receive the complete payload. Hence, they are
not able to detect the attack. Moreover, since the victim is also roaming, the
detection ability of the stateful NIDSs that monitor the victim’s home and
foreign networks is reduced. We distinguish between node mobility through
tunneling and direct communication.
Tunneling. Portion 2 is forwarded to the victim through a home agent,
as shown in Figure 2b. In this case the home NIDS of the victim receives
Portion 1 and 2, and it is able to detect the attack. However, the attacker
is able to inject the payload into the victim without evidence for the victim
home and network NIDSs (partially stealth attack).
Direct communication. Portion 1 and 2 are routed directly to the victim,
as shown in Figure 2a. Here both the victim home and foreign NIDS are
unable to detect the attack, because they do not receive the complete pay-
load. Hence, none of the four stateful NIDSs can detect the attack, which is
completely stealth.
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4. Solution through NIDS cooperation
Mobility-based NIDS evasion prevents even modern stateful NIDSs to
build a complete state, thus exposing them to the same evasion strategies
that were effective only against obsolete stateless NIDS systems. We propose
a cooperative solution based on distributed stateful NIDSs exchanging state
information. The idea is to extend with three functions the mobility proto-
cols that allow a mobile node to roam: extraction and serialization of state
information related to a mobile node from the NIDS deployed in the origin
network (state export), transmission of the serialized state to the destination
network NIDS, deserialization and merging of the transmitted state informa-
tion within the state of the destination network NIDS (state import). The
entire process is called state migration and allows NIDS state information
to “follow” the mobile node in the new network, thus preventing de facto
mobility-based evasion.
To implement state migration we introduce the External Agent, a modular
software deployed in all the networks hosting cooperating NIDSs. For each
supported mobile protocol, an external agent detects roaming events and
triggers the appropriate state export and import operations among the NIDSs
involved in the origin and destination networks. This solution requires only
limited changes to the NIDS code base and can be extended to different
mobile protocols through new Plugins. We discuss three cases, corresponding
to possible migrations of the mobile node. In the First Migration case, the
mobile node roams from the home network to a foreign network. In the
Return to Home case, the mobile node returns to its home network. In the
Further Migration case, the mobile node roams from a foreign network to
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another foreign network. In the descriptions of these scenarios, we assume
that:
1. state migration takes place via a secure channel (e.g., SSL/TLS) to
guarantee authentication of the external agents, non-repudiation, mes-
sage integrity and confidentiality;
2. a trust relationship between the networks among which the mobile node
is roaming (otherwise, importing untrusted data into a NIDS could
compromise its integrity and thereby network security);
3. the external agent is capable of analyzing the whole network traffic (or
at least the portion generated by the mobile nodes) within its network,
with the goal of detecting when a mobile node joins the network;
4. the external agent deployed in a foreign network is able to determine
the IP address of the external agent deployed in the home network of
a mobile node.
Sections 5, 6 and 7 discuss all these requirements for specific mobile protocols.
4.1. First Migration
Figure 3 shows the sequence of messages exchanged during the state mi-
gration process. On the left we represent the mobile node migration omitting
specific protocol messages. On the right we report each message exchanged
among the deployed external agent and the NIDSs monitoring the home and
the foreign network. The order in which the hosts are placed left-to-right
does not necessarily reflect the real network topology. The Foreign External
Agent and the Home External Agent are the external agents deployed in the
foreign and home networks, respectively.
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Figure 3: Sequence diagram for the “First Migration” scenario
When the foreign external agent detects the arrival of a new mobile node,
it retrieves information about its home network. This operation could be
performed in different ways depending on the protocol used by the mobile
node for migration (more details on this in Sections 5, 6 and 7). Once the
foreign external agent has obtained the address of the home external agent,
it sends to it a request asking for the state information related to the mobile
node. This request is analyzed by the home external agent, which verifies
its consistency (e.g., it checks whether the mobile node has really left the
home network and joined the foreign network), then it exports the requested
state information stored by the home NIDS and sends the extracted data to
the foreign external agent. The latter pre-processes the received information
accordingly to the mobile protocol implementation, guarantees the correct
normalization of the content and that the format is the same used by the
foreign NIDS. Once the foreign NIDS has merged the received data into
its internal state, all the communications related to the mobile node are
monitored correctly. If an attacker tries to exploit one of the mobility-based
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NIDS evasion scenarios described in Section 3, the fragments of the malicious
payload are merged into the state information of the foreign NIDS, which
now is able to analyze the whole payload and detect the attack. Hence, state
migration driven by mobile activities prevents mobility-based NIDS evasion.
4.2. Return to Home
Figure 4 shows the sequence of messages exchanged during state migra-
tion. Unlike the previous scenario, here all the roles but the mobile node are
reversed. When the home external agent detects the return of the mobile
node, it asks the foreign external agent for related state information. If the
home external agent has previously cached the address of the foreign exter-
nal agent when the mobile node left the home network, it can now contact it
directly; otherwise, it has to infer its address from the captured network traf-
fic. In the latter case, it could sniff messages containing IP address updates
(IP in Figure 4) and related acknowledgments (IPA in Figure 4). When the
request reaches the foreign external agent, steps similar to those described in
the previous scenario are executed. The foreign external agent replies to the
home external agent with the state information exported from the foreign
NIDS. Then, the home external agent pre-processes the received data and
imports the state information into the home NIDS.
4.3. Further migration
The main difference between this scenario and the first migration phase
in Section 4.1 is that the mobile node reaches the destination network from
a different foreign network that we call Origin Network. Hence the relevant
state information is only known by the NIDS deployed in the origin network,
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Figure 4: Sequence diagram for the “Return to Home” scenario
the Origin NIDS. This can be a problem, because the chance exists that the
external agent of the destination network cannot infer the address of the ex-
ternal agent operating in the origin network exclusively from messages sent
by the mobile node. Without this address, the external agent of the destina-
tion network is unable to issue a request for the relevant state information
directly to its corresponding agent in the origin network.
Figure 5: Sequence diagram for the “Further Migration” scenario
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To solve this problem, the external agent of the destination network in-
tegrates two concurrent approaches. When it detects the arrival of a new
mobile node, it analyzes network packets sent by the mobile node (messages
IP and IPA in Figure 5) and tries to extrapolate some useful information to
detect the external agent of the origin network. At the same time it looks for
packets related to the home network. If the former approach succeeds, the
external agent of the destination network directly contacts the corresponding
external agent in the origin network and the sequence of steps is the same as
in the first migration scenario depicted in Section 4.1.
Otherwise, the external agent of the destination network issues a state
export request (REQ1 in Figure 5) to the external agent of the home network.
We recall that this is possible because the external agent of the home network
knows the address of the external agent in the foreign network, since the latter
has already asked to the former the state information related to the mobile
node when it roamed to the origin network. Then, the external agent in the
foreign network sends the state export to the origin NIDS that contains the
relevant state information. This information (STATE1 in Figure 5) is finally
forwarded through the external agents of the origin and home networks to
the external agent of the destination network, where it is pre-processed. The
refined state information is then delivered to the destination NIDS (now
immune to mobility-based NIDS evasion techniques).
5. WiFi environments
In this section we describe mobility-based NIDS evasion and related coun-
termeasures in a wireless LAN (WLAN) based on WiFi. Here, the main ac-
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tors are the nodes equipped with wireless network interfaces and the Access
Points that allow nodes to connect to the wired network infrastructure. In
order to join the network, a node has to successfully complete the authen-
tication and the association phases by exchanging specific packets with the
access point. This procedure has to be repeated each time a mobile node
decides to migrate to a new access point.
5.1. WiFi evasion
When a mobile node roams from an access point to another one in the
same network, the migration is completely transparent to the network layer
and above, thus ensuring uninterrupted connections with the other nodes.
The mobility-based NIDS evasion technique can be exploited when the access
points involved in the roaming process route the network traffic through
different paths monitored by different NIDSs. This scenario reflects large
organizations where the network is divided into different and independent
departments. A unique WLAN for the entire network of the organization
(same ESSID and subnetwork) enables mobile nodes to freely move around.
In this scenario, each access point routes the network traffic through the
gateway of its department, hence the NIDSs deployed in each department
are able to monitor only a portion of the network traffic generated within
the WLAN. A mobile attacker can roam even without physically moving if he
can reach the coverage area of the new access point. All he has to do is force
his wireless network interface card to be associated to the new access point.
Then he can evade the respective NIDSs by splitting the malicious payload
into two portions and sending them through two different access points.
Another option is represented by an attacker targeting a mobile node. To
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detect the migration of a mobile node from one access point to another, an
attacker can monitor network traffic looking for messages related to roaming
(such as packets exchanged during the association to the new access points).
Then, the attacker sends Portion 1 while the victim is associated to an access
point, and he waits until the association process to the second access point
has been completed. Finally, he sends Portion 2.
5.2. WiFi cooperation
To enable the NIDS cooperation scheme proposed in Section 4, the ex-
ternal agents need to detect the migration of a mobile node between access
points. In addition, the external agents require information about the home
and origin networks in order to request the state information related to pre-
vious network activity of the mobile node. The 802.11g standard does not
require a specific agent for managing the roaming processes of the mobile
nodes. Access points have to maintain a local table containing the infor-
mation of the associated nodes and they need to know when one of them
is not associated anymore. Other components of the network do not know
neither through which access point it is possible to reach a wireless node
nor in which department the wireless node is operating. This means that it
is difficult to trace movements of mobile nodes migrating from network to
network. In order to solve this problem several approaches exists, including
(but not limited to) the following.
A first approach introduces two extra software components: an agent
deployed within each department in charge of reporting the detected wire-
less nodes; a centralized module which collects information from each agent
and can reply to the requests concerning wireless nodes locations. Then,
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the external agent is configured to contact the collector in order to obtain
information about the origin networks of the mobile nodes.
Alternatively, one can provide to each external agent a list of the nearby
external agents. Here the assumption is that mobile nodes can migrate only
between adjacent access points. When an external agent detects a new mobile
node within the monitored network segment, it broadcasts a state export
request to all the neighbors. Then, it receives a reply only from those having
state information related to the signaled mobile node.
Finally, one can leverage the characteristics of specific protocols. For
instance, in a WiFi network which requires user authentication and provides
authentication and authorization services through the RADIUS protocol, it
is possible to trace the position of mobile nodes by deploying an extra agent
within the RADIUS server. This agent is in charge of registering the origin
of the accepted authentication requests, while the external agentss can be
forced to contact it in order to obtain the requested addresses.
6. Mobile IPv4 environments
The goal of Mobile IP is to allow a mobile node to communicate with
other hosts after changing its point of attachment to the Internet without
changing its IP address. Mobile IP allows a mobile node to be always reach-
able at its Home Address also when attached to a network different from
the home network. To pursue this goal, the mobile node needs to support
Mobile IP. Moreover, the home and the foreign networks have to deploy
the mobility home agent and the foreign agent, respectively. No software
module is required for the fixed nodes which communicate with the mobile
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node. Mobile IP has two communication schemes for mobile nodes which
are within a foreign network. Reverse Tunneling routes all the packets sent
by the mobile node through the origin network, where the home agent is in
charge to process them. Triangular Routing enables the mobile node to di-
rectly send packets to a corresponding node, while receiving replies through
the home network. This approach reduces communication latency at least in
one direction, without extra requirements for the corresponding nodes.
6.1. Mobile IP evasion
In case of tunneling the mobile evasion attack follows the same scheme
described in Section 3. The more interesting scenario is triangular routing,
which we discuss next. We refer to the three scenarios described in Section 3.
Mobile victim. From the attacker’s point of view, when the mobile node
is the victim, the tunneling mode and the triangular routing scheme are
similar because both fragments sent to the mobile node pass through the
home network. In fact, when triangular routing is enabled, only the packets
sent by the victim are directly routed to the attacker, while the packets sent
by the attacker pass through the home network, but these differences do not
change the attack scheme.
Mobile attacker. When an attacker enables triangular routing, he can
directly send Portion 2 to the victim, thus the NIDSs monitoring the attacker
are unable to detect the malicious payload, which can be detected by the
NIDS deployed in the victim network.
Mobile victim and attacker. If both the attacker and the victim are mobile
nodes using triangular routing, the attacker can skip detection by the NIDSs
monitoring his network and by the victim’s foreign NIDS, but the whole
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malicious payload could be detected by the home NIDS of the victim. From
the point of view of the attacker, Portion 2 is directly sent to the victim,
but it actually passes through the victim home network because the victim
receives packets through his home agent.
In summary, when Mobile IPv4 is adopted, a mobile evasion attack is
detected at least by the home NIDS of the victim, but not by the foreign
NIDS of the victim nor by that of the attacker. We also highlight that both
routing schemes of Mobile IPv4 introduce a noticeable communication delay,
and an attacker can exploit this latency in order to detect the migration of
the victim from the home network to a foreign network.
6.2. Mobile IP cooperation
In a Mobile IP network, when a mobile node joins a foreign network it has
to register its new position to the home agent. This task can be accomplished
through two procedures through the Care-of-Address that is, a temporary IP
address that allows a home agent to forward messages to the mobile device.
If the mobile node receives its care-of address from the foreign agent, it
is mandatory to send registration messages to the home agent through it.
Otherwise, if the mobile node uses a co-located care-of address obtained
without the intervention of a foreign agent, it has to exchange registration
messages directly with the home agent. In both cases, two specific messages
are involved: Registration Request and Registration Reply. The main fields
contained in the former are the home address of the mobile node, the home
agent’s address, the identification field, the care-of address and its lifetime.
The request is sent to the home agent which may or may not accept the
registration, but in both cases it has to inform the mobile node sending a
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registration reply message.
These two registration messages can be exploited by the foreign external
agent to detect the arrival of a new mobile node and to extrapolate the
necessary information to initiate the state migration process. In particular,
the home address, the care-of address and the home agent’s address can
be retrieved from the registration request message, while the registration
reply is analyzed to verify if the registration succeeded or failed. In the
former case, the foreign external agent sends the state export request to the
home external agent asking for the state information related to the mobile
node home address. Then, the received data is pre-processed by the foreign
external agent and imported into the foreign NIDS.
7. Mobile IPv6 environments
Mobile IPv6 is an extension for IPv6 which allows nodes to remain reach-
able while migrating from one network to another through its home address
and a new care-of address obtained from each joined networks. The Mobile
IPv6 protocol allows two communication modes between mobile node and its
correspondent node (be it fixed or mobile). The former, Bidirectional Tun-
neling, is similar to Mobile IPv4 tunneling, where the mobile node and the
correspondent node communicate through the home agent, and can be used
when the correspondent node does not support Mobile IPv6. The latter,
Route Optimization, establishes direct communications between a correspon-
dent node and a mobile node also when the latter is in a foreign network. This
operation is enabled through the Care-of-Address, that is, an IPv6 unicast
routable address within the foreign network which is automatically assigned
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to the mobile node when it joins the network and can be used to route packets
directly to the mobile node.
7.1. Mobile IPv6 evasion
Bidirectional tunneling is similar to the tunneling mode previously de-
scribed. Also the route optimization scheme is similar to direct communica-
tion, but some specific details deserve a discussion. When the mobile node
migrates from the home network to the foreign network, it generates a unique
care-of address belonging to the foreign network address space, and transmits
it to the home agent through a Binding Update message. The mobile node
also challenges the correspondent node’s ability to support IPv6 mobility. If
the correspondent node supports Mobile IPv6, then it replies to the binding
update message received from the mobile node. All the following network
packets between the correspondent node and the mobile node are directly
routed between them and do not pass through the home network. On the
other hand, if the correspondent node does not support Mobile IPv6, it keeps
sending packets to the home address. They are received by the home agent
and tunneled to the mobile node in the foreign network. From the attacker’s
point of view, the messages exchanged to enable route optimization (e.g.,
binding updates) are useful to detect the migration of the mobile node, and
they represent a more accurate solution compared to the time based detec-
tion in Mobile IPv4. Moreover, the time interval between the phase of joining
the foreign network by the mobile node and the establishment of the route
optimization can be used to plan a more complex attack. Indeed, an attacker
could split the malicious payload in three different portions and then send
the first fragment before the migration of the mobile node, the second after
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the migration, but before the route optimization and the final fragment after
route optimization has taken place. The three packets follow three different
paths which could require extra work for the deployed NIDS.
7.2. Mobile IPv6 cooperation
7.2.1. Migration detection in IPv6
The binding update of the home agent is simple: the mobile node sends
a special packet containing its home address and its care-of address to the
home agent. Then, the home agent replies with a Binding Acknowledge, con-
firming the receipt of this information. While this last acknowledgement is
optional, the former is necessary for the mobile node to maintain the active
connections alive. Thus, the foreign external agent can start the state mi-
gration as soon as it detects the binding acknowledge addressed to the home
agent. Furthermore, from the same packet it can extract the IP address of
the home agent which, according to our last assumptions in Section 4, corre-
sponds to that of the home external agent. Then, the foreign external agent
can send a request to the corresponding home external agent specifying the
mobile node’s home address in order to obtain the related state information.
Once the foreign external agent has received the reply, it pre-processes the
state information and finally imports the data into the foreign NIDS.
7.2.2. Route optimization
IPv6 provides a route optimization scheme which enables direct commu-
nication between the mobile node and the correspondent node. However,
route optimization can be activated only if the correspondent node supports
it and only after the correspondent node receives the binding update. Until
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that moment, all the mobile node’s active connections to and from any cor-
respondent node are tunneled through the home agent using an IPv6-in-IPv6
encapsulation. Thus, the foreign NIDS sees some already active connections
between the mobile node and its home agent and some new connection be-
ginning between the mobile node and the correspondent node. However, if
the NIDS does not explicitly support MIPv6, it does not merge together the
state information of those connections even if they are the same connections
(at least at the transport level). For this reason a new scenario is required
to manage IPv6-based mobile migrations. Figure 6 shows the messages ex-
changed during state migration after route optimization.
Figure 6: Route optimization sequence diagram
When the foreign external agent detects the binding update and binding
update acknowledgement messages exchanged between the mobile node and
the correspondent node (be it fixed or mobile; in Figure 6 it is depicted as a
fixed one), it starts the state migration process. The sniffed messages contain
several pieces of information, in particular the home address of the mobile
node, the address of the correspondent node and the address of the home
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agent. Then the foreign external agent is able to issue an export request
(REQ1 in Figure 6) to the foreign NIDS, asking for all state information
related to the home agent. This state information (STATE1 in Figure 6) is
pre-processed by the foreign external agent in order to extract only the state
information related to the network packets exchanged between the mobile
node and the correspondent node that have just performed route optimiza-
tion. This selection allows the management of connections established with
different correspondent nodes, which may or may not support route optimiza-
tion and which in the former case switch to direct communications in differ-
ent time intervals. Finally, the pre-processed state information (STATE1* in
Figure 6) is sent to the foreign NIDS in order to be imported.
8. Performance evaluation
To show the viability and the effectiveness of the proposed solution to
mobile evasion, we design and implement a prototype which provides state
migration support among multiple NIDS sensors. This framework consists
of three main components.
• The implementation of the state.import and state.export functions that
extract and insert state information related to a specific IP address,
respectively. This patch is integrated in the source code of Snort that
is a popular open source NIDS.
• The external agent that invokes the state.import and state.export func-
tions. It is implemented as a software module that interacts with the
local Snort and other external agents working on cooperating Snort
modules.
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• A set of plugins that manage the specific details of each mobile protocol.
In this version, we have three plugins for WiFi, Mobile IPv4 and Mobile
IPv6 protocols. There are no conceptual limits to integrate future
protocols or different versions of existing mobile protocols.
Figure 7: Experimental testbed
Figure 7 shows the considered testbed, where the two clouds on the left
denote a home network and the foreign network, which provide mobility
support based on Wi-Fi, MIPv4 or MIPv6. Each network is monitored by the
Home Host and Foreign Host which, for the sake of simplicity, execute both
our modified Snort and an instance of our external agent. Hence, the home
host acts as home NIDS and home external agent, while the foreign host acts
as foreign NIDS and foreign external agent. These machines are connected to
a Cisco Aironet 1100 access point providing wireless connectivity to mobile
nodes. The mobile node is a laptop with a wireless network interface, while
the correspondent node is a fixed host. All machines run GNU/Linux with
kernels 2.6.35 or 2.6.39, recompiled with all the needed modules to support
mobility. Node mobility through Mobile IPv4 is guaranteed by the home
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host and foreign hosts running the Dynamics Mobile IP daemon. In order
to support Mobile IPv6 and route optimization, the home host, the mobile
node and the correspondent node run the mip6d daemon, and the home
host and foreign host run the radvd daemon. We replay all the described
attack scenarios and verify the possibility of evading the NIDSs as reported
in Section 3.
To evaluate the prototype performance we select one environment, Mo-
bile IPv6, and analyze two main features: timings of the state migration
procedure and impact of migrations on NIDS performance. We measure the
time required by state migration and the execution time of state.export
and state.import. We replay the mobility-based evasion several times un-
der various network conditions. In particular, we generate synthetic network
traces characterized by a different number of simultaneously active TCP con-
nections. This is a factor with a direct impact on the resource consumption
of the two NIDSs because each NIDS has to create and maintain a dedicated
session for each monitored TCP connection. The measures related to these
tests are reported in Figure 8a, where the X-axis is the number of concur-
rent TCP connections in the network traces monitored by Snort, and the
Y-axis reports the time in ms. The triangles and circles denote the dura-
tion of state export and state import operations under different numbers of
concurrent connections, respectively. Each point in the graph represents the
average computed over five different experiments. Figure 8a shows that the
time required to import the state of the mobile node in the Foreign NIDS is
independent of the number of concurrent connections and is lower than 14
ms. On the other hand, the time required to export the state of the mo-
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bile node increases linearly with the number of active TCP connections until
Snort reaches the limit of concurrent connections tracked by the Stream5
pre-processor, which is 8192 by default. After that, the state export time re-
mains constant. In our tests the time required to export the state information
is less than 32 ms, even in the worst case.
We also measure the time required to complete the state migration pro-
cess, defined as the time elapsed between the state.export request sent to
the home external agent by the foreign external agent, and the receipt of the
result of the state.import operation from the foreign NIDS. The related
experimental results are summarized in Table 1. The average state migra-
tion time (409 ms) is dominated by network delays. This value is one order
of magnitude lower than the time required by the mobile node to complete
the roaming from the home to the foreign network (on average 8.835s in our
experimental testbed). These results and the ability of our prototype to han-
dle out-of-order network packets1 show that it is compatible with real time
analysis of live network traffic.
To estimate the impact of state migration on Snort performance, we run
several experiments for evaluating the maximum NIDS bandwidth for a given
packet loss rate. The choice of the traffic trace is not simple for a fair NIDS
evaluation because there is no standard consensus, there is no benchmark and
the widely adopted IDEVAL set [18] is now deprecated because it refers to a
scenario that is not at all representative of modern traffic. In our experiments
we use a trace of the Capture-the-Flag Hacking Contest held in 2010, which
1The ability to handle out-of-order network packets is inherited from Snort and im-
proves tolerance to network delays.
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Table 1: Times required by state migration activities
Average [ms] σ [ms] Peak [ms]
State import 12 1 13
State export (worst case) 30 1 31
Complete state migration 409 176 765
Network roaming 8835 3495 13209
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(a) State importing and exporting times (b) Snort: original vs. patched
is reasonably recent, publicly available and contains several attacks.
In the first experiment we compare the performance of the original Snort
against our framework, which includes a modified version of Snort and the
external agent that we run on the same machines. We use the default Snort
configuration, and we replay the registered network traces at different speeds
ranging from few Mb/s up to 160Mb/s using TCPreplay. We measure the
average bit rate generated by TCPreplay and the number of dropped packets
registered by Snort. The results are reported in Figure 8b. On our hardware,
in both the scenarios Snort is able to process 100% of packets up to 20-25
Mb/s, then it starts dropping packets. The behavior of the original Snort
and the patched Snort is the same up to 70-80 Mb/s with a 10% margin.
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By increasing the bit rate of the network traces up to 160Mb/s, the patched
Snort performs slightly worse at a 25% of dropped packets against 22% of
the original Snort. However, both values are too high to be acceptable in real
contexts. This means that in the bandwidth range manageable by Snort, our
framework offers performance similar to the unmodified version. It is worth
remarking that our results provide a lower bound to the real performance of
the prototype, because we run both Snort and the EA on the same host.
The goal of the second set of experiments is to determine the impact of
state migration on framework performance. In addition to the traffic traces
used in the previous experiment, we prepare several traces simulating the mi-
gration of different mobile nodes. These traces contain some TCP segments
exchanged between the mobile node and the correspondent node, the bind-
ing update packets used by Mobile IPv6, and the state.export requests sent
by the foreign external agent to the home external agent. We focus on the
state.export mechanism due to its heavier impact on Snort than state.import.
Figure 9: Patched Snort performance with and without roaming for both traces
We replay the registered network traffic at different speeds ranging from
about 20Mb/s to 40Mb/s, a small range around which Snort starts to drop
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packets. Then, we replay the synthetic network traces by simulating mobile
nodes roaming at regular intervals: 0.5s, 1s and 2s. We measure the number
of packets dropped by Snort and the actual average bit rate generated by
Tcpreplay. The results are plotted in Figure 9, where we can appreciate that
there is no clear difference in performance for different roaming intervals.
This reflects the low impact of the state migration on Snort performance. In
particular, the state.export operation keeps Snort busy for 10-30 ms, that is
a limited time period during which the received packets fill the buffer. As
soon the operation ends, Snort processes events and it frees the buffer prior
to the next roaming.
The last set of experiments aims to verify whether the impact of the state
migration process could become more distinguishable at higher bit rates. We
compare the performance of our framework in the case of two migrations
per second and in the case of no migration at all, and consider a range from
about 10 Mb/s up to 170 Mb/s. The results are shown in Figure 10a and
in Figure 10b that is a zoom of the range 15-35 Mb/s. While the average
results obtained in the two scenarios are really close to each other, the impact
of the state migration process is evidenced by the dispersion of measures
than is larger than that related to the absence of state migration. These
results confirm the effectiveness and the validity of the proposed solutions
and prototype.
9. Conclusions
We describe a new attack, called mobility-based evasion, that can be used
to perform stealth network intrusions and that is undetectable by state-of-
33
(a) Patched Snort: w/o roaming vs.
roaming every 0.5 seconds
(b) Patched Snort: zoom in the 15-
40Mbps range
the-art NIDS architectures. This attack is not due to design or implementa-
tion flaws, but it is a strategy combining fragmentation of a malicious payload
and node mobility. We also propose an original solution to mobility-based
evasion and implement it in a prototype as an extension of the popular Snort
software. Several experimental results confirm the efficacy and the efficiency
of the proposed solution for several protocols offering network mobility.
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